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This project is an experimental implementation of Multi-Level Security 
(MLS) lattice model by using semantic web technologies (OWL) to create and 
test Mandatory Access Control (MAC) with Bell-LaPadula (BLP) properties. 
Semantic web (web of data) is building on top of the World Wide Web (web of 
documents), aiming to make data machine-readable so that to improve data 
processing and management. OWL is a semantic web computational logic-base 
language which is designed to represent complex knowledge in semantic format. 
With the MLS ontology, we are able to define dominance relationship between 
variables within the lattice model and perform different queries to verify if the 
subject (with security clearance) can access (read/write) to the object (with 
security classification). Moreover, by leveraging BLP properties, the ontology 
would only allow information to flow from entities with lower classification to 
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Web development has never stopped since the birth of the Internet in 
1962. To look back from these days, it requires users to have expert knowledge 
for accessing information through the Internet. In the 1990s, the founder of the 
World Wide Web, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, invented the World Wide Web and wrote 
the three fundamental technologies of the web, HTML, URI and HTTP. In 
addition, with the invention of search engines to form today’s digital world that 
enables normal people to access the information on the web without any expert 
knowledge. In the past 20 years, the rapid growth of web technologies upgraded 
the web to a data centered processing age, in which users become the 
mainstream in data generation through broadcasting and social networking. 
Berners-Lee, Hendler and Lassila (2001) first discussed their vision of the web in 
the future. They discussed that the current web is the foundation of semantic 
web. It’s goal is to apply semantic meaning to the web to make data machine-
readable and develop new technologies to better store, process and express 
knowledge with large volume of data.  
Some parts of the vision have already come true. Semantic web 
technologies have been used in the healthcare industry and artificial intelligence 
for knowledge modeling. Meanwhile, information security is always a critical 
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topic. Throughout the years, cybersecurity professionals are aware of the 
challenges brought by new web technologies such as cloud computing,  big data, 
Internet of Things, etc. The security threats are not only coming from the Internet, 
but also from the internal environment. Case studies such as Marriott Data 
Breach (Sanger et al., 2018) and US Office of Personnel Management (Thomas, 
2019) proved that design and maintaining the security of information systems is 
the priority for both private and government agencies. Organizations have the 
obligation to collect, process, store and share sensitive data in a secure manner. 
For example, health care information of patients, top secret military resources 
and personal identity information should all be protected because data breach 
can cause huge financial loss to individuals and organizations as well as 
increase national security issues. Multi-level security policy (MLS) is prevalent in 
military systems, and further enforced on their contractors and partners. The 
increasing security threats from both internal and external environments also 
lead a lot of organizations to embrace to the MLS in order to raise their security 
profile. Each uses access control to require pre-authorized user privileges to gain 
access to the designated information according to the classification of the data. 
While the web is extending in a semantic manner, some questions came 
to mind. Security measures should be implemented in every layer of the web 
environment. When the data are formalized with semantic meaning, what kind of 
security measures can be used to protect the data in a semantic environment? 
Even though no study shows a semantic version of MLS implementation, if it is 
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possible to implement the MLS policy in this environment? Hence, I think there 
are emerging needs to upgrade the access control policies while adopting new 
web technologies within the organization. Therefore, the security policies should 
also make an extension to enforce information security management in the 
semantic web environment.  
Organization 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
summarizes the past studies on MLS and provides a brief introduction of the 
semantic web. Chapter 3 demonstrates how the MLS lattice model is constructed 
by using Protégé, and Chapter 4 discusses how to use semantic web rule 
language to apply dominance rules in the ontology.  In conclusion, Chapter 5 









Mandatory Access Control 
Defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), the 
Mandatory access control (MAC) is a type of  nondiscretionary access control 
that enforces a uniform security level to all subjects and objects in an information 
system. (“Mandatory Access Control”, n.d.) To prevent the information flow from 
a subject must be authorized (with security clearance) to access an object (with 
security classification). Past research shows that MAC is closely related to Multi-
Level Security (MLS). MLS is first proposed by the defense community to 
maximize the protection of sensitive and confidential information. (43.6. Multi-
Level Security(MLS), n.d.) It is widely used in the defense industry, especially in 
the military system and government with higher levels of security than those in 
private business and organizations. In addition, MLS uses the Bell-LaPadula 
(BLP) model to prevent confidential information flow from higher level to lower 
level with the need-to-know requirement. (Kim, 2020) According to Bell (2005), 
Denning (1976) introduced a lattice structure, Bell-LaPadular (BLP) model, to 
compare the security levels of user clearance and information classification.  
Within a large and complex information system, sensitivity level it is not 
flexible enough to classify the information sensitivity and user clearance. The 
BLP model uses  additional information known as a compartment (also called 
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category or need to know) to specify MLS security labels or levels. An MLS 
security level or label is a sensitivity level or a pair of a sensitivity level and a set 
of compartments. In this project, we use a colon to separate a sensitivity level 
and a set of compartments when defining a security level or label in concept. 
(Elliott,1990; van Tilborg, Jajodia, 2011) A few examples of security levels are 
TopSecret:{bio,chem}, Secret:{}, and Unclassified:{nuke,bio}.   
Dominance Rule 
An MLS system has a dominance rule that defines a partial order (≤) over 
the MLS security levels. The partial ordering (≤) is always defined such that two 
security levels can be compared for dominance: 
Given two security levels l1 with sensitivity level S1 and compartment 
C1, and l2 with sensitivity level S2 and compartment C2. We write l1 ≤ l2, 
meaning l1 is dominated by (is less than) l2 or l2 dominates (is greater than) l1 
when 
• S2 is equal to or higher than S1 
• C1 is a subset of C2, namely, C1 ⊆ C2 
BLP Security Policy (Bell, 2005) 
The BLP security policies enforce that every subject and object must have 
at least one security label. To block information flow from entities with higher 
sensitivity level to ones with lower sensitivity level within the information system, 
two important properties are proposed: simple security property and star property 
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(Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Left side: without BLP properties information can flow from high to 
low. The simple security condition would prevent low from reading high. The star 
property would prevent high from writing to low. Right side: with BLP properties 
information can only flow from low to high. 
 
 
Simple Security Policy 
Also known as the “no read-up” policy of the BLP model  states that a 
subject with certain security clearance cannot read an object with a higher 
classification. Therefore, given the subject’s security label sl(S) and the object’s 
security label sl(O), the subject can read the object when 
sl(O) ≤ sl(S) 
Example 1. Assuming Alice is granted a security clearance TS:{bio}, 
namely, sl(Alice) =TS:{bio} and the object O1 has the security classification 
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TS:{bio, chem}, namely, sl(O1) = TS:{bio, chem}. {bio} is a subset of {bio, chem}. 
Then, Alice cannot read O1 as sl(Alice) ≤ sl(O1). 
* (Star) Property 
Also known as the “no write-down” policy states that a subject with certain 
security clearance cannot write to any object with a lower security classification. 
Therefore, given the subject’s security label sl(S) and the object’s security label 
sl(O), the subject can write the object when  
sl(S) ≤ sl(O) 
Example 2. Referring the same scenario in Example 1, sl(Alice) = TS:{bio} 
and sl(O1) = TS:{bio, chem}. Then Alice can write to O1 as sl(Alice) ≤ sl(O1). 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Lattice structure (Kim, 2020) 
 
Example 3. The diagram in Figure 2.2 depicts the partial ordering (≤) over 
the MLS security levels as a lattice. Assuming Bob is granted a security 
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clearance TS:{}, namely, sl(Bob) = TS:{} and Frank is granted a security 
clearance S:{}, namely, sl(Frank) = S:{}. Two objects, O2 is classified as TS:{}, 
namely, sl(O2) = TS:{}, and O3 is classified as S:{}, namely, sl(O3) = S:{}. 
Compare the security labels between the subjects and the objects. Between Bob 
and O2, sl(Bob) = TS:{} = sl(O2), Bob can read and write O2. Similarly, since 
sl(Frank) = S:{} = sl(O3), Frank can read and write to O3. As sl(Bob) = TS:{} is 
higher than sl(O3) = S:{}, Bob can only read O3. Bob will be blocked from writing 
to O3 because information cannot flow from high to low. As S:{} ≤ TS:{}, Frank 
can write to O2 but not read O2.  
Example 4. Attaching compartments to sensitivity level gives more 
flexibility to information classification in a complex information system. Figure 2.2 
shows that there is no partial ordering between TS:{} and S:{bio} (i.e., they are 
not comparable). This means that no operation such as read or write should be 
performed between them.  
Multi-Level Security 
The lattice structure of MLS with BLP model (Figure 2.3) is formed with 
vertices connected by edges. The model distinguished two sets of vertices with 
different colors by their hierarchy levels. Each security label (SL(si, ci)) has two 
components, sensitivity level Si and compartment Ci. Sensitivity level is 
hierarchically defined with a range from high to low, “Top Secret”  “Secret”  
“Classified”  “Unclassified”. Compartment is defined as {Bio, Nuke} ⊇ {Bio} | 
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{Nuke} ⊇ {}. Vertices in red area are labels with “Top Secret” clearance (noted as 




Figure 2.3. Lattice Model (Kim, 2020) 
 
Example 5. Based on Figure 2.3, “Top Secret” TS_{} is considered a 
higher classification than “Secret” S_{}. TS_{} can read S_{} because information 
is allowed to flow from a lower classification (“Secret”) to a higher classification 
(“Top Secret”). Inversely, it prohibits S_{} read up to TS_{} to prevent information 
leaking from higher classification to lower classification. Meanwhile, S_{} can 
write up to TS_{} but TS_{} cannot write down to S_{}.  
Moreover, the BLP model does not grant users with “Top Secret” 
clearance to access all objects. With additional need-to-know restriction, known 
as compartment (Example 6), to block irrelevant users from accessing 
confidential information. (Denning, 1976; Panossian, 2019) 
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Example 6. Based on Figure 2.3, assuming Mary with security clearance 
TS_{} is trying to read/write the object file with security classification S_{Nuke}. 
Mary passes the first criteria because she has a “Top Secret” clearance which is 
higher than the object file classification. However, she also needs a compartment 
{Nuke} to meet the second criteria. {} can not grant her access to objects with 
{Nuke}. This example explains how the need-to-know condition is applied to 
provide an extra layer of protection to the information system.  
In this project, the mathematical notation used to define a security label 
such as SL(Si,Cj) is also expressed in terms of  SL(TS_{Bio,Chem}) or SL(TS, 
{Bio,Chem}). To examine if there is a dominance relationship between two 
security label variables, both dominance rules must be satisfied. Once the 
dominance relationship exists, the two BLP properties can be easily applied to 
complete the MLS policies based on this relationship.  
In addition, the lattice structure specifies the path of information flow 
according to the dominance relationship between the vertices through the edges. 
(Panossian, 2019) To block information leaking from higher classification to lower 
classification (Figure 2.4), MLS enforces simple security property and star 
property. Example 7 and Example 8 each will discuss the scenarios how each 
BLP property ensures the information flow from lower classification to higher 
classification. These examples will illustrate the rules to identify if a subject (S) 




Figure 2.4. Information Flow with BLP (Kim, 2020) 
 
Example 7. Assuming a person A (si) has the security clearance S_{Bio} 
and an object (oi) with the classification TS_{Bio, Nuke}, s cannot read o because 
SL(si) ≤ SL(oj). However, si can read any object when SL(si) ≥ SL(oj). For 
instance, SL(oj) equal to S_{Bio} and SL(ok) equal to  S_{}. (Kim, 2020) 
Example 8. Assuming every variable has the same security label as 
shown in Example 7, person (si) can now write to oi and oj because SL(si) ≤ SL(oj), 
which allow information to flow from lower level security clearance to higher level 




Intro to the Semantic Web and Technologies 
 
Figure 2.5. The Layers of Semantic Web Technology 
 
Semantic Web is an extension of the current world wide web standardized 
by the W3C. Its goal is to make the implicit meaning of data to be explicitly 
represented, so that the data is machine-readable to improve information 
retrieval and produce more useful work. Some of the semantic web technologies 
(Figure 2.5), RDF, OWL, SWRL and Protégé, are used in this project and each 
will be given a brief introduction. 
RDF 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a fundamental block of the 
semantic web built on top of HTML, HTTP, and XML to express the semantic 
meaning of knowledge. The resource  can be anything and must be uniquely 
identified and referenced via Internalized Resource Identifier (IRI). Knowledge is 
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expressed in a list of statements called triple, which follows a simple schema with 
three components, subject, property and object. In RDF, the subject and the 
property must be IRI, and the object of the triple can be either an IRI or a literal 
(datatype).  
OWL 
The W3C Web Ontology Language (OWL) is a Semantic Web language 
designed to represent rich and complex knowledge based on description logics 
to describe classes, individuals and properties. It transfers the common 
knowledge of philosophy and mathematics into a formal language in the form of 
RDF to give semantic meaning, so that the knowledge becomes machine 
understandable. The goal of building an OWL ontology is to create a model that 
represents a subject of matter with individual things, kinds of things, and kinds of 
relationships, as well as support automated reasoning. A class represents things 
of an interest group, an individual is an instance of a class, and a property 
defines the relationship between subjects and objects. Description logic 
separates terminological knowledge base to assertional knowledge base. 
Terminological knowledge base describes the relationships between classes 
when defining the model and assertional knowledge describes how individuals 
are related to each other.  
Semantic Rule Language (SWRL) 
SWRL combines OWL ontology and DataLog expressions that apply 
DataLog rules to OWL ontologies in the form of “If…then…” statements. SWRL 
14 
 
rules are in the form of “Antecedent -> Consequent”. The term “Antecedent” is 
also referred to rule body and “Consequent” is referred to rule head. (O’Connor 
et al., 2005) The body represents the “If…” statement and the head represents 
the “then…” statement. An example SWRL rule can be: 
SecurityLabel(?a) ^ SecurityLabel(?b) ^ sameAs(?a,?b) -> read(?a,?b) 
 This example explains the rule states that “If two security label a is equal 
to security label b, then a can read b.” For the implementation of BLP in chapter 
4, such rules will be created to apply the read/write relationship between subjects 
and objects. Each will be discussed and shown output of implementation. 
 Without SWRL, the ontology can still be implemented by manually created 
assertions in the editor. However, if an ontology has hundreds of assertions for a 
small ontology to made to represent the knowledge without using an inference 
engine, it is very inefficient for manually processing data. SWRL provides 
automated reasoning functions. The inference engine can finish the work of 
creating inference assertions in  milliseconds. Moreover, modification of an 
individual can cause modification of several assertions. SWRL can carry the rest 
of the modification to improve work efficiency. Several studies have shown that 
using SWRL can improve business process management. According to Abadi, 
Ben-Azza, Sekkat (2018), SWRL is the only tool which gathers the ontology to 
model the information and model decision making rules for industrial 
applications. Matsokis and Kiristsis also suggested using SWRL to extend the 
OWL models to develop a learnable approach in production management. (2011) 
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Furthermore, Roy, Dayan and Holla presented that it supports business 
knowledge management in industrial business processes. (2018)  
Protégé  
 Protégé is an open-source ontology editor developed by Stanford Center 
for Biomedical Informatics Research at the Stanford University School of 
Medicine. This tool is widely used by academic, government, and corporate 
groups. It complies with W3C standards, has visualization support and extensive 
build-in tools to support ontology construction. According to Rubin et 
al.(2005),Protégé provides a variety of features to support developers in creating, 
modifying and managing ontologies:  
• Simple and customizable user interface 
• Support collaboration work 
• Visual support for ontology expressions 
• Built-in reasoners for checking consistency and inference engine 
• Multiple formats for exporting ontology to other platforms 




MODELING MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY IN OWL 
This chapter will demonstrate the steps of building MLS ontology in 
Protégé.  
The three key components of OWL ontology are classes, properties and 
individuals. To distinguish each component, this project uses the following 
naming conventions without spaces: 
1. Classes: upper camel cases (e.g., Person, Animal, Food) 
2. Properties: lower camel cases (e.g., isGreaterThan, hasPet, movesTo) 
3. Individuals: leading underscore (e.g., _JohnSmith, _Dog, _Pizza) 
Building MLS Ontology 
Step 1. Create Classes 
The implementation starts with defining the terminological knowledge. 
Previously, Chapter two discussed that a security label has two components, 
sensitivity level and compartment. The first step is to create three classes, 
SecurityLabel, SensitivityLevel, Compartment and their subclasses. Refer to the 
lattice structure in Figure 2.2, each node will be a subclass of SecurityLabel. A 
security label has two components, sensitivity level and compartment. TopSecret 
and Secret are subclasses of SensitivityLevel; and BioNuke, Bio, Nuke, 
Null(represents { }) are subclasses of Compartment. Because OWL uses open 
world reasoning, it means if two classes are not specified to be different types of 
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things, they are unknown to be different and allow to have intersections. To say 
that there are no common members in SecurityLabel, SensitivityLevel and 
Compartment, these three classes are disjoint to each other. It means that one 
individual cannot be an instance of more than one of the three. Protégé allows 
users to create a list of classes and indicates disjointness by using the Create 
Class Hierarchy tool. To verify the implementation, select a random class to view 
in the bottom of the Class Description. All sibling classes of the selected class 
should be shown in the Disjoint With section. 
In addition, at the same class hierarchy level as SecurityLabel, 
SensitivityLevel and Compartment, two more disjoint classes, Subject and Object 
are created for implementation in the next chapter. Table 1 shows the full list of 
classes with class hierarchy levels. 
 
























Step 2. Create Object Properties and Inverse Properties 
The second step is to define the binary relationships (properties) between 
entities. Table 2 shows how common knowledge is converted into RDF triple and 
property for MLS ontology: 
 
Table 2. Convert the Knowledge into RDF Triple and Property  
Knowledge RDF Triple Property 
A security label consists of 











The compartment BioNuke 
has subset Bio or Nuke. 
BioNuke hasSubset (Bio or 
Nuke) 
hasSubset 
The (sensitivity level) Top 
Secret is greater than 









Security label TS_{Bio} 
dominates security label 
S_{Bio}. 
TS_Bio dominates S_Bio. Dominates 
Security label TS_{Bio} 





A Subject can read an 
Object 
Subject canRead Object. canRead 
A Subject can write to an 
Object 
Subject canWrite Object CanWrite 
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There are two types of RDF property. The first type is object property 
which links individuals to individuals, and the second type is datatype property 
which links individuals to RDF datatypes (e.g. string, integer, date, etc.). In this 
MLS ontology, all properties are object properties.  
Properties have characteristics. In Protégé(Figure 3.1), it is very easy to 
specify the characteristics of the property. The transitive characteristic will be 
specified in three properties, hasSubset, isGreaterThan and dominates. These 
properties have the characteristics that if X is related to Y and Y is related to Z, 
then X is related to Z. It is not necessary to add an assertion to state that X is 
related to Z. The inference engine can generate the inferred axioms if the 




Figure 3.1. Apply Transitive Characteristic to isGreaterThan 
 
Protégé also gives the option to define the domain and the range of 
properties with the same meaning in mathematics. Given two individuals are 
connected by a property in an RDF triple. The domain class specified that the 
subject of the triple belongs to the domain class as well as the object of the triple 
belongs to the range class. 
Table 3 lists the domain and range is listed for each property. Take the 
hasSensitivityLevel  as an example, the domain of this property is SecurityLabel, 
and the range is SensitivityLevel. Whenever a triple assertion contains 
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hasSensitivityLevel, the subject of this triple should be an instance of 
SecurityLabel, and the object should be an instance of SensitivityLevel.  
With the specification of property domain and range as well as class 
disjointness, the built-in Protégé reasoner Pallet can catch inconsistent 
assertions which conflict with the description logic expressed in the model. The 
reasoner can catch inconsistent assertions such as A (instance of SecurityLabel) 
hasSensitivityLevel B (instance of Compartment), or A (instance of 
Compartment) hasSensitivityLevel B (instance of SensitivityLevel).  
 
Table 3. List of Property Domain and Range 
Object Property Domain Range 
hasSensitivityLevel SecurityLabel SensitivityLevel 
hasCompartment SecurityLabel Compartment 
hasSubset Compartment Compartment 
isGreaterThan SensitivityLevel SensitivityLevel 
dominates SecurityLabel SecurityLabel 
isIncomparableTo SecurityLabel SecurityLabel 
canRead Subject Object 
canWrite Subject Object 
 
 
Each object property can have its inverse property. In an RDF triple, the 
property links the subject to the object in one direction. Its inverse property 
applies this relationship from an opposite perspective. For example, if A is linked 
to B through property P, the inverse way of saying the same thing is that B is 
linked to A through inverse property Pi. In Protégé, the inverse relationship 
between P and Pi can be defined in the Property Description panel. To better 
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support the rule inferences in the next chapter, an inverse property is created for 
each object property (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Property and Inverse Property 











Step 3. Modeling Classes Expression with Property Restrictions 
The third step is to apply property restrictions to model class expression. 
Properties describe the relationship between individuals. It can also be used as a 
special kind of class description to emphasize that all instances of the class must 
satisfy the restriction. There are four types of property restrictions, existential, 
universal, cardinality and value restrictions. To model the SecurityLabel class, 
existential and universal restrictions will be used to define SecurityLabel and its 
subclasses. Take TS_BioNuke (Figure 3.2) as example, the class must qualify 
for two conditions: 
1. The class must have a sensitivity  label and the security label must be 
TopSecret. (existential & universal) 
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2. The class must have a compartment and the compartment must be 
BioNuke. (existential & universal) 
According to the two conditions, four new property restrictions are applied: 
1. hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret 
2. hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret 
3. hasCompartment some BioNuke 
4. hasCompartment only BioNuke 
User can click the compartment of TS_BioNuke, BioNuke, Protégé will 
redirect to class description of this class(Figure 3.3). 
 
 





Figure 3.3. Compartment BioNuke 
 
Moreover, the bellowing table is a list of the property restrictions applied to 
each class. 
 
Table 5. Property Restrictions of Each Class 
Class Subclass Property Restrictions 
Compartment BioNuke hasSubset some (Bio or Nuke) 
Bio hasSubset some Null 
Nuke hasSubset some Null 
SensitivityLevel TopSecret isGreaterThan some Secret 
Secret isGreaterThan some Confidential 
Confidential isGreaterThan some Unclassified 
SecurityLabel  hasSensitivityLevel some SensitivityLevel 
hasCompartment some Compartment 
TS_BioNuke hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret 
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret 
hasCompartment some BioNuke 
hasCompartment only BioNuke 
TS_Bio hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret 
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret 
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Class Subclass Property Restrictions 
hasCompartment some Bio 
hasCompartment only Bio 
TS_Nuke hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret 
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret 
hasCompartment some Nuke 
hasCompartment only Nuke 
TS_Null hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret 
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret 
hasCompartment some Null 
hasCompartment only Null 
S_BioNuke hasSensitivityLevel some Secret 
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret 
hasCompartment some BioNuke 
hasCompartment only BioNuke 
S_Bio hasSensitivityLevel some Secret 
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret 
hasCompartment some Bio 
hasCompartment only Bio 
S_Nuke hasSensitivityLevel some Secret 
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret 
hasCompartment some Nuke 
hasCompartment only Nuke 
S_Null hasSensitivityLevel some Secret 
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret 
hasCompartment some Null 
hasCompartment only Null 
Subject  hasSecurityLabel some SecurityLabel 
Object  hasSecurityLabel some SecurityLabel 
  
 
Step 4. Create Individuals with Property Assertions 
After modeling classes with property restrictions, we can then create 
instances with property assertions. Table 6 shows a list of individuals with their 





Table 6. Individuals with Property Assertion 
Class Individual Property Assertions 
BioNuke _Compartment_BioNuke hasSubset _Compartment_Bio 
hasSubset _Compartment_Nuke 
Bio _Compartment_Bio hasSubset _Compartment_Null 
Nuke _Compartment_Nuke hasSubset _Compartment_Null 
Null _Compartment_Null  
TopSecret _SensitivityLevel_TopSecret isGreaterThan _SensitivityLevel_Secret 
Secret _SensitivityLevel_Secret  
TS_BioNuke _SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_BioNuke 
TS_Bio _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_Bio 
TS_Nuke _SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_Nuke 
TS_Null _SecurityLabel_TS_Null hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_Null 
S_BioNuke _SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_Secret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_BioNuke 
S_Bio _SecurityLabel_S_Bio hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_Secret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_Bio 
S_Nuke _SecurityLabel_S_Nuke hasSensitivityLevel 
_SensitivityLevel_Secret 
hasCompartment _Compartment_Nuke 







Till this step, the security label modeling has completed. The ontology 
modeling constructs terminology assertions are applied to classes with property 
restrictions. Assertional knowledge is represented with individuals. For testing 
purposes, select Compartment individual _Compartment_Bio and add an object 
property assertion to represent _Compartment_Bio isGreaterThan 
_Compartment_Null. Running Pellet reasoner, an inconsistentOntologyException 
error message popped up because Protégé explains (Figure 3.2) that the domain 
and range of isGreaterThan are limited to SensitivityLevel, which is disjoint to 
Compartment. The test assertion conflicts with the specified domain and range 
classes of isGreaterThan. This test shows the reasoner’s capability of catching 








SWRL RULE IMPLEMENTATION FOR MAC AND BLP 
Apply Dominance Rule 
This section uses a Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) to apply 
dominance rules to the MLS ontology. SWRL combines OWL and DataLog 
expressions in the form of Horn-like rules to express “If …, then …” statements. 
The SWRL inference engine checks the set of predefined rules to apply the 
relationship to the matching variables. Therefore, any modification of the 
ontology will automatically update the inferred axioms by SWRL. The purpose of 
using SWRL is not only to use it as an inference engine, but also SWRL can 
transfer the inferred axioms to the OWL model to make them explicitly 
represented. The ontology (with inferred axioms made by inference engine) can 
be exported to be reviewed in simple text editor or other semantic tools.  
For a pair of security labels, the dominates relationship is not directly 
asserted. Refer to the dominance rule discussed in Chapter 2, two security labels 
can be compared for dominance: 
An MLS system has a dominance rule that defines a partial order (≤) over 
the MLS security levels. The partial ordering (≤) is always defined such that two 
security levels can be compared for dominance: 
Given two security levels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, we write L1 ≤ L2, 




• S2 is a higher sensitivity level than S 
• C1 is a subset of C2, namely, C1 ⊆ C2 
Property dominates and its inverse property isDominatedBy are used to 
represent the dominance relationship between the security labels. Convert the 
mathematical notation into SWRL, the following rules are created: 
Rule 1: 
S1 - Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S1 = S2, C2 
has subset C1, then L2 dominates L1. 
 
Rule 2: 
S2- Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S2 is greater 
than S1, C2 has subset C1, then L2 dominates L1. 
 
Rule 3: 
S3. Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S2 is greater 
than S1, C2 = C1, then L2 dominates L1. 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^ 
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^ 
sameAs(?S1,?S2) ^ hasSubset(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L1,?L2) 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1)  ^ 
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^ 




Testing MLS Ontology with Mandatory Access Control Criteria 
This section demonstrates scenario tests to use SWRL queries to detect 
comparable security label pairs (Figure 4.1) and incomparable security label 
pairs (Figure 4.3) to verify if the MLS lattice model is correctly implemented. The 
SWRL queries can be executed in the SQWRLTab in Protégé to extract 
information from both asserted and inferred axioms generated by the SWRL 
inference engine.  
Test Scenario 1 (Comparable Security Labels) 
Query 1: 
SQ1 - Show all pairs of security labels with dominates relationships by 
ascending order. 
 
The SQ1 query represents that if there exists a dominates relationship 
between two variables L1 and L2, then select all matching pairs from the 
database and output L1 then L2 in ascending order. The domain and range of 
property dominates are pre-defined, therefore, the dominates relationship only 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ dominates(?L1,?L2) -> 
sqwrl:select(?L1,?L2) ^ sqwrl:orderBy(?L1,?L2) 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^ 
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^ 
isGreaterThan(?S2,?S1) ^ sameAs(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L2,?L1) 
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exists in pairs of SecurityLabel instances. Run the query and the result is shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
 
.  
Figure 4.1. List of All Comparable Security Label Pairs 
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To see the dominates relationship applies to a specific security label, for 
example, _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, a test query SQ2 below can show all security 
label instances which are dominated by it.  
Query 2: 




Figure 4.2. List of Comparable Security Labels of _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio 
 
In Figure 4.2, three security label instances are returned. In lattice model 
(Figure 2.3), even the node TS{Bio} is not directly linked to the node S{Null}, but 
it dominates nodes TS{Null} and S{Bio}, which both dominate S{Null}. The 
dominates(_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, ?L) -> sqwrl:select(?L) 
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inference engine refers to the dominates property’s transitivity characteristics to 
make a inferred axiom that TS{Bio} dominates S{Null}.   
Test Scenario 2 (Incomparable Security Labels) 
In lattice model, even though the compartment {Bio} and {Nuke} are both 
subset of compartment {Bio,Nuke}. In this test, an object property 
isIncomparableTo represents the incomparable relationship between 
_Compartment_Bio and _Compartment_Nuke. Rule S4 will be used to create 
incomparable relationship between two security labels if their compartments are 
incomparable, and SQ3 is the query to show all security label pairs which has 
incomparable relationship. The result of SQ3 is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Rutle 4: 
S4 - Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if C1 and C2 
are incomparable, then L1 and L2 are incomparable.  
 
Query 3: 
SQ3 - Show all incomparable security label pairs. 
 
Compare the result of SQ3 (Figure 4.3) to the result of SQ1 (Figure 4.1). 
There is no same pair of security labels in both queries’ results. Hence, the 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1, ?C1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ 
hasCompartment(?L2, ?C2) ^ isIncomparableTo(?C1, ?C2) -> 
isIncomparableTo(?L1, ?L2) 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ isIncomparableTo(?L1, ?L2) -> 
sqwrl:select(?L1, ?L2) ^ sqwrl:orderBy(?L1, ?L2) 
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implementation shows that no MAC criteria are violated. The assumption can be 
made that if two security labels are not comparable, then no dominates 
relationship exists between them.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. List of Incomparable Security Labels 
 
SWRL Rules for BLP Implementation within a Single Domain 
This section demonstrates the BLP models to apply the simple security 
property and the star property to subjects (S) and objects (O), each with its own 
35 
 
security label. In Protégé, create a list of new Individuals with Assertions shown 
in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Subject and Object Individuals with Assertions 
Class Individual Assertion 
Subject _Subject_1 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke 
_Subject_2 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Null 
_Subject_3 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Bio 
_Subject_4 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio 
_Subject_5 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke 
_Subject_6 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Null 
_Subject_7 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke 
_Subject_8 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Nuke 
Object _Object_1 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Nuke 
_Object_2 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Null 
_Object_3 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio 
_Object_4 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Null 
_Object_5 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke 
_Object_6 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_S_Bio 
_Object_7 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke 
_Object_8 hasSecurityLabel  _SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke 
 
 
Simple Security Property 
The “no read up” policy states that a subject (S) at a security level (sl(S)) 
may not read an object (O) if the security level (sl(O)) of the object is higher than 
the security level(sl(S)) of the subject. So the subject can read the object when: 
sl(O) ≤ sl(S) 
 Therefore, canRead can utilize the pre-defined dominates relationship 
between security labels. R5 defines that if the security label of the subject SL 
dominates the security label of the object, then the subject can read the object. In 
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addition, R6 defines that if the subject’s security label is equal to object’s security 
label, then they exist canRead relationship, and RQ4 queries a complete list of 
canRead relationships in this ontology(Figure 3.7). 
Rule 5: 
S5 - If sl(S) dominates sl(O), then sl(S) canRead sl(O).  This rule 
expresses that if the subject has higher classification than the object, then apply 
the canRead relationship between these two variables. 
 
Rule 6: 
S6. If sl(S) = sl(O), then sl(S) canRead sl(O). This rule expresses that if 
the subject and the object have the same classification, then apply canRead 
relationship to these two variables. 
 
Query 4: 
SQ4 - Show the list of canRead Objects of each Subject , both with their 
security labels in order of the Subject, then by the Object (Figure 4.4). 
 
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^ 
hasSecurityLabel(?S,?OL) ^ dominates(?SL,?OL) -> canRead(?S,?O) 
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^ 
hasSecurityLabel(?O,?OL) ^ sameAs(?SL,?OL) -> canRead(?S,?O) 
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S, ?SL) ^ 
hasSecurityLabel(?O, ?OL) ^ canRead(?S, ?O) -> sqwrl:select(?S, ?SL, ?O, 




Figure 4.4 Query Result of SQ4 
 
 To verify the implementation, the Example 1 in Chapter 2 states that a 
subject with security clearance TS:{bio} cannot read the object with security 
classification TS:{bio,chem} because they both have top secret sensitivity level 
,but the compartment of the object is higher than (hasSubset) the subject’s. In 
the ontology, the minor difference is that this project uses {bio, nuke} instead of 
{bio,chem}. The consumption is verified that the subject with 
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio can only read the objects with four types of security 
clearances: _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, _SecurityLabel_TS_Null, 
_SecurityLabel_S_Bio and _SecurityLabel_S_Null. 
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Example 5 also discussed the scenario that a subject with clearance TS_{} 
can read the object with classification S_{}. There is a matching record in Figure 
4.4 shows that _Subject_2 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_TS_Null) canRead 
_Object_2 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Null). 
 
* (Star) Property 
 The “no write-down” policy states that a subject at a given security level 
may not write to any object at a lower security level. The canWrite relationship 
exists when sl(S) ≤ sl(O). canWrite utilize the dominates in the inverse way of 
canRead: 
Rule 7: 
S7 - If sl(O) dominates sl(S), then sl(S) canWrite sl(O). This rule 
expresses that if the classification of the object dominates (lower than) the 




S8 - If sl(S) = sl(O), then sl(S) canWrite sl(O). This rule expresses that if 
the subject and the object have equal classification, then apply the canWrite 
relationship to these two variables. 
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S, ?SL) ^ 
hasSecurityLabel(?O, ?OL) ^ isDominatedBy(?SL, ?OL) -> canWrite(?S, ?O)  
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^ 




SQ5 -  Show the list of canWrite Objects of each Subject , both with their 
security labels in order of the Subject, then by the Object (Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5. Query Result for SQ5 
Look at Figure 4.5, shows all pairs of canWrite relationships which apply 
to the combination of subject and object variables. Each record shows a subject 
with a lower or equal clearance canWrite the object with a higher or equal 
classification. The following three records improve the hypotheses discussed in 
Example 2., Example 3. and Example 7: 
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1. _Subject_4 with _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio canWrite _Object_7 with 
_SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke. 
2. _Subject_6 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Null) canWrite 
_object_4 (hasSecurityLabel __SecurityLabel_TS_Null) 
3.  _Subject_3 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Bio) canWrite 
_object_7 (hasSecurityLabel __SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke) 
Additional Notes for Implementation 
Unlike other query languages of Protégé, SWRL queries only extract the 
information from assertional knowledge (relationships between individuals). It is 
very important to make sure the actual assertions are made for each individual. 
In OWL, it’s not wrong to leave the object property assertions blank, but the 
inference engine cannot make any inferred assertion without assertional 
knowledge input. For example, to apply dominance rule S1 with two given 
variables L1 (_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio) and L2(_SecurityLabel_TS_Null). Each 
must be explicitly defined with sensitivity level and compartment. If L1 does not 
have a clear classification of its compartment C1, even it has a compartment 
instance Bio on terminology side, but in the rule the two conditions -
hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) and has Subset(?C1,?C2) are not fulfilled. 
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^ 
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^ 






 This project set an experimental solution for MLS policy in OWL by 
leveraging semantic web technologies and concepts. The proposed methodology 
consists of three stages. The first stage is modeling security level follows the 
MLS concepts. The second stage uses semantic web rule language to apply 
dominance rules adhering to MAC criteria. The third stage implements the 
ontology with BLP properties within a single domain. Test queries verify that 
classified information can only be accessed by authorized users. The results 
indicate that the MLS policy can be adopted within semantic web infrastructure.  
According to the Semantic Scholar, this ontology is the first MLS practice 
in research studies. It has potentials for organizations to apply this security policy 
to protect sensitive data.    
Future Work 
 Semantic web also allows connection to multiple ontologies in different 
domains. The future work can extend the current implementation to MLS multi-
domain access control with trust agreement. This will build an extra layer of 
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